Skip to content

Nutanix

Nutanix (Prism) [BETA]

Beta

This integration is currently in beta. Features, field names and suggested rules may change. Validate parsing and detection rules before deploying to production.

This page explains how to collect Nutanix logs (Prism Central / Prism Element) and forward them to Sekoia.io using Syslog (recommended), API, or object storage exports.

Overview

  • Product: Nutanix Prism (Prism Central / Prism Element)
  • Use cases: administrative audits, infrastructure events, Security Policy Hit Logs, and Flow service logs for troubleshooting.

Overview

  • Vendor: Nutanix
  • Supported environment: On-premises (Prism Central / Prism Element)
  • Detection based on: Audit logs, policy hit logs, and service telemetry

Nutanix Prism provides system and audit logs that are useful for security monitoring (administrative actions, infrastructure changes, and network policy hits).

Specification

Prerequisites

  • Administrative access to Prism Central (or Prism Element for local configurations)
  • Network connectivity from Prism to your log concentrator or Sekoia.io forwarder
  • Intake key on Sekoia.io for the target intake

Transport Protocol/Method

  • Syslog (UDP/TCP)
  • RELP (optional) for improved reliability
  • TLS (between sources and concentrator) when configured in intakes.yaml
  • API exports and object storage (S3) exports for offline/batch ingestion

Logs details

  • Supported formats: JSON payloads (API_AUDIT / AUDIT), and RFC5424 syslog lines for hit logs and service messages.
  • Supported verbosity: INFO for audits (recommended), DEBUG only when troubleshooting.

Step-by-Step Configuration Procedure

Configure Prism Central (UI)

  1. Log in to Prism Central as an administrator.
  2. Navigate to Admin Center → Settings → Syslog Server.
  3. Click Add Syslog Server and provide server name, IP, port, transport (UDP/TCP) and optional RELP.
  4. On Data Sources, select API_AUDIT, AUDIT, Security Policy Hit Logs and set severity to INFO for audits.
  5. Save and verify propagation to Prism Elements if desired.

Configure via nCLI (illustrative)

# Example (verify exact syntax for your version)
ncli cluster add-remote-syslog-server server-name="sekoia" server-ip="10.0.0.10" server-port=514 transport=udp
ncli cluster update-remote-syslog-server server-name="sekoia" modules=API_AUDIT,AUDIT,SECURITY_POLICY_HIT_LOGS severity=INFO

Create the intake

Go to the intake page and create a new intake using the Nutanix format on Sekoia.io: https://app.sekoia.io/operations/intakes

Configure a forwarder

To forward events using syslog to Sekoia.io, you need to update the syslog header with the intake key you previously created. Here is an example of your message before the forwarder

<%pri%>1 %timestamp:::date-rfc3339% %hostname% %app-name% %procid% LOG RAW_MESSAGE
and after
<%pri%>1 %timestamp:::date-rfc3339% %hostname% %app-name% %procid% LOG [SEKOIA@53288 intake_key="YOUR_INTAKE_KEY"] RAW_MESSAGE

To achieve this you can:

  • Use the Sekoia.io forwarder which is the official supported way to collect data using the syslog protocol in Sekoia.io. In charge of centralizing data coming from many equipments/sources and forwarding them to Sekoia.io with the appropriated format, it is a prepackaged option. You only have to provide your intake key as parameter.
  • Use your own Syslog service instance. Maybe you already have an instance of one of these components on your side and want to reuse it in order to centralize data before forwarding them to Sekoia.io. When using this mode, you have to configure and maintain your component in order to respect the expected Sekoia.io format.

Warning

Only the Sekoia.io forwarder is officially supported. Other options are documented for reference purposes but do not have official support.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Nutanix Prism. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Nutanix Prism on ATT&CK Navigator

Burp Suite Tool Detected

Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).

  • Effort: intermediate
Correlation Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 62 characters and requested at least 50 times in a 10 minutes range time. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
Discord Suspicious Download

Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.

  • Effort: advanced
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
EvilProxy Phishing Domain

Detects subdomains potentially generated by the EvilProxy adversary-in-the-middle phishing platform. Inspect the other subdomains of the domain to identify the landing page, and determine if the user submitted credentials. This rule has a small percentage of false positives on legitimate domains.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
Internet Scanner

Detects known scanner IP addresses. Alert is only raised when the scan hits an opened port, on TCP or UDP. This could be a very noisy rule, so be careful to check your detection perimeter before activation.

  • Effort: master
Internet Scanner Target

Detects known scanner IP addresses. Alert is only raised when the scan hits an opened port, on TCP or UDP and group by target address. This could be a very noisy rule, so be careful to check your detection perimeter before activation.

  • Effort: master
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential Azure AD Phishing Page (Adversary-in-the-Middle)

Detects an HTTP request to an URL typical of the Azure AD authentication flow, but towards a domain that is not one the legitimate Microsoft domains used for Azure AD authentication.

  • Effort: intermediate
Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 62 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io Activity Logs Rule Deactivation Bulk

Detects a massive rule deactivation observed threw Sekoia.io activity logs.

  • Effort: master
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: master
Suspicious TOR Gateway

Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: advanced
TOR Usage

Detects TOR usage, based on the IP address and the destination port (filtered on NTP). TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master
Telegram Bot API Request

Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind

  • Effort: advanced

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.